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This paper employs numerical simulations of the Park and Sabourian
(2011) herd model to derive new theory-based predictions for how infor-
mation risk and market stress influence aggregate herding intensity. We
test these predictions empirically using a comprehensive data set of high-
frequency and investor-specific trading data from the German stock market.
Exploiting intra-day patterns of institutional trading behavior, we confirm
that higher information risk increases both buy and sell herding. The model
also explains why buy, not sell, herding is more pronounced during the fi-
nancial crisis.
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1 Introduction
Herd behavior by investors can be a significant threat to the functioning of financial
markets. The distorting effects of herding range from informational inefficiency to
increased stock price volatility, or even bubbles and crashes. This paper derives two
theory-based predictions for how information risk and market stress influence herding
intensity that are tested with high-frequency and investor-specific trading data from
the German stock market. We focus on information risk, defined as the probability of
trading with a counterparty who holds private information about an asset (Easley et al.
(1996)), since the presence of information asymmetries is a necessary condition for herd
behavior. To date, however, it is not clear how herding intensity reacts to changes in
information risk. A better understanding of this relationship could enhance a financial
regulator’s ability to identify herds. In light of the recent financial crisis, our second
focus is on how herd behavior is affected by market stress, that is, situations in which
investors are both pessimistic and uncertain about the stock’s value. While herding
certainly has the potential to create such market stress, it is not obvious whether the
reverse relationship holds, but if it does, its existence threatens to create vicious cycles
of economic downturns and high volatility regimes.
Building on Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O’Hara (1987), the lit-
erature on information risk deals with estimating the information content of trades,
see e.g. Hasbrouck (1991), Easley et al. (1996) and Easley et al. (1997). The effects of
information risk on herding intensity, however, are underresearched.1 While the proba-
1An exception is Zhou and Lai (2009) who provide evidence that herding is positively related to
information risk measured by probability of informed trading (PIN), see e.g. Easley et al. (1997).
The idea underlying the PIN measure is that there will be a distinct trading pattern on days when
information events occur. More specifically, informed trading is possible only on days with information
events. Since, moreover, information is not noisy, i.e. the information can never be wrong, days with
information events (i.e. high information risk) are characterized by a strong accumulation of (informed)
traders on one side of the market. The Lakonishok et al. (1992) measure employed by Zhou and Lai
(2009) identifies herding also as the accumulation of traders on one side of the market. As a consequence,
we would expect a positive relationship between PIN and the Lakonishok et al. (1992) herding measure
by construction. The same should be true of the herding measure introduced by Sias (2004). Therefore,
our estimations of information risk are not based on the PIN measure.
1
bility of informed trading is a key parameter in financial market herd models, compare
e.g. Avery and Zemsky (1998) and Park and Sabourian (2011), to date these models
have not been exploited to discover the impact of information risk on herding intensity.
This is surprising, since the effects of information risk on herding intensity are far from
obvious. On the one hand, an increase in information risk increases the average infor-
mation content of an observed trade. As a consequence, traders update their beliefs
more quickly and those investors that are susceptible to herding are more easily swayed
to follow the crowd. On the other hand, increased information risk amplifies the mar-
ket maker’s adverse selection problem, compare Easley et al. (2002). Given the higher
probability of trading at an informational disadvantage, the market maker quotes larger
bid-ask spreads which tends to prevent potential herders from trading. Understanding
which of these counteracting effects dominates could facilitate the detection of herds.
The impact of market stress on herd behavior has not been analyzed by the theoret-
ical herding literature, either. Typically, herd models focus on the reverse relationship.
For example, Park and Sabourian (2011) demonstrate that price paths tend to be more
volatile in the presence of herd behavior. Agent based models proposed by, for example,
Lee (1998) and Egúıluz and Zimmermann (2000) show that herd behavior contributes
to fat tails and excess volatility in asset returns. A notable exception is Avery and
Zemsky (1998), who show that herding is possible provided multiple sources of un-
certainty exist. Their model does not imply, however, that more uncertainty actually
leads to more herding. The prevalent unidirectional focus of the theoretical literature
is particularly puzzling in light of the mixed evidence regarding the impact of market
stress on herding intensity. Chiang and Zheng (2010) and Christie and Huang (1995)
find that herding increases during times of market stress, whereas Kremer and Nautz
(2013a,b) find that herding in the German stock market slightly decreased during the
recent financial crisis, which is similar to the results of Hwang and Salmon (2004) for
herding intensity during the Asian and the Russian crisis in the 1990s.
We base our theoretical analysis on the financial market herd model of Park and
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Sabourian (2011), which can be viewed as a generalization of the seminal work of
Avery and Zemsky (1998).2 One important extension is the broader set of different
information structures that allows a differentiated discussion of how information ex-
ternalities may contribute to herd behavior under various market conditions including
scenarios of high and low market stress. Relating investor herding to the shape of the
information structure instead of to multi-dimensional uncertainty, Park and Sabourian
(2011) identify more explicitly those situations in which the potential for herding is
high. Consequently, the Park and Sabourian (2011) framework is more appropriate for
finding and explaining high degrees of herding. In fact, experimental evidence suggests
that the Avery and Zemsky (1998) framework discovers little or no herd behavior,
see Cipriani and Guarino (2009).3 In contrast, experiments based on the Park and
Sabourian (2011) model find that herding in financial markets can be substantial, see
Park and Sgroi (2012). In Park and Sabourian (2011), herding is triggered by infor-
mation externalities that an investment decision by one agent imposes on subsequent
agents’ expectations about the asset value, see Bikhchandani et al. (1992) and Banerjee
(1992).4 Therefore, this model is a natural candidate for investigating the impact of
information risk on herding intensity.5
2Similar to the bulk of the theoretical literature, both models define herd behavior as a switch in
an agent’s opinion toward that of the crowd, see Brunnermeier (2001). As herders ignore their private
information, herd behavior is informationally inefficient and thus has the potential to distort prices and
destabilize markets.
3Avery and Zemsky (1998) includes three model setups. The first setup extends the traditional
herd model of Bikhchandani et al. (1992) by a price mechanism that prevents herd behavior. The most
prominent experimental tests of the Avery and Zemsky (1998) framework, Drehmann et al. (2005) and
Cipriani and Guarino (2005), focus on this setup and confirm the theoretical prediction of no herding.
Cipriani and Guarino (2009), on the other hand, focus on one of the setups in which herd behavior is
predicted, but again find only little evidence of it.
4Alternative drivers for herd behavior include reputational concerns as well as investigative herding.
Reputational herd models modify the agents’ objective functions such that their decisions are affected
by positive externalities from a good reputation, see e.g. Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Graham (1999)
and Dasgupta et al. (2011). Investigative herd models examine conditions under which investors may
choose to base their decisions on the same information resulting in correlated trading behavior, see
e.g. Froot et al. (1992) and Hirshleifer et al. (1994). For a survey of the early herding literature see
Devenow and Welch (1996). For an in-depth discussion of how the herding literature ties into the social
learning literature see Vives (1996).
5Other financial market herd models such as Lee (1998), Chari and Kehoe (2004), and Cipriani and
Guarino (2008), investigate how investor herding is related to transaction costs, endogenous timing of
trading decisions, and informational spillovers between different assets, respectively.
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The history dependence of trading decisions in financial market herd models drasti-
cally impedes derivation of analytical results on herding intensity. This may explain why
financial market herd models have not yet been exploited to make empirically testable
predictions on the impact of information risk and market stress. Moreover, standard
empirical herding measures, including Lakonishok et al. (1992) and Sias (2004), examine
herding intensity on an aggregate level.6 Therefore, a theory-guided empirical analysis
of herd behavior requires theoretical predictions on herding intensity aggregated over
investor groups, time periods, and heterogeneous stocks, which further complicates the
derivation of analytical results.
In this paper we circumvent these problems by simulating the Park and Sabourian
(2011) model for more than 13,000 different parameterizations that broadly cover the
theoretical parameter space, generating about 2.6 billion trades for analysis. We obtain
two testable hypotheses on aggregate herding intensity. First, an increase in information
risk should result in a symmetric increase of buy and sell herding intensity. Second,
high market stress should be found to have an asymmetric effect on herding intensity:
while buy herding is predicted to surge during crisis periods, the simulation results
suggest that sell herding intensity increases only moderately.
Both our predictions are confirmed by particularly appropriate intra-day, investor-
specific data provided by the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin).
Empirical studies typically have to rely on either investor-specific but low-frequency
data (e.g. Lakonishok et al. (1992), Sias (2004), Wermers (1999)), or on high-frequency
but anonymous transaction data (compare, e.g., Barber et al. (2009)). Kremer and
Nautz (2013a) regress daily herding measures on size, volatility, and other stock charac-
teristics to analyze the causes of herding. The current paper expands on these studies
6In Lakonishok et al. (1992), herding of a group of investors is measured as the tendency to ac-
cumulate on one side of the market. Specifically, the authors test whether the share of net buyers in
individual stocks significantly deviates from the average share of net buyers across all stocks of the
considered stock index. Sias (2004) investigates whether the accumulation of investors on one side of
the market persists over time by measuring the cross-sectional correlation of the share of net buyers
over adjacent time periods.
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in two important aspects. First, similar to the bulk of the empirical literature, the
empirical analyses of Kremer and Nautz (2013a,b) are only loosely connected to the
theoretical herding literature. In contrast, the simulation-based predictions derived in
this paper allow us to interpret evidence on herding through the lens of a financial
market herd model. Second, to the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to
analyze intra-day herding intensity using investor-specific data. In line with herding
theory, the use of intra-day data is particularly appropriate for measuring herd behavior
induced by information externalities. Measuring herding at lower frequencies may bias
the results because new information might have reached the market in the meantime,
creating a new environment for investor behavior. The use of investor-specific data is
particularly important as we need to directly identify transactions by each trader in
order to determine whether an investor follows the observed actions of other traders.
To assess herding empirically, we employ the herding measure proposed by Sias (2004).
The dynamic nature of the Sias measure makes it particularly appropriate for the anal-
ysis of high-frequency data. Interestingly, the Sias measure has not yet been applied
to intra-day data.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we review the
model of Park and Sabourian (2011). We define information risk as well as market
stress and provide an initial qualitative assessment of their effect on herding intensity.
Section 3 introduces the simulation setup and derives testable hypotheses regarding the
role of information risk and market stress for aggregate herding intensity. Section 4
introduces the empirical herding measure. Section 5 presents the data and the empirical
results. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Information Risk and Market Stress in a Herd Model
2.1 The Model
Park and Sabourian (2011) consider a sequential trading model à la Glosten and Mil-
grom (1985), consisting of a single asset, both informed and noise traders, and a market
maker. The model assumes rational expectations and common knowledge of its struc-
ture.
The Asset: There is a single risky asset with unknown fundamental value V ∈
{V1, V2, V3}, where V1 < V2 < V3. Without loss of generality, let V1 = 0, V2 = 1
and V3 = 2. The prior distribution 0 < P (V = Vj) < 1 for j = 1, 2, 3 determines
the degree of public uncertainty Var(V ) about the asset’s true value before trading has
started. The asset is traded over T consecutive points in time. In Section 3, we choose
T = 100 for the model simulation.
The Traders: Traders arrive in the market one at a time in a random exogenous order
and decide to buy, sell, or not to trade one unit of the asset at the quoted bid and ask
prices. Traders are either informed traders or noise traders. The fraction of informed
traders is denoted by µ. Informed traders base their decision to buy, sell, or not to
trade on their expectations regarding the asset’s true value. In addition to publicly
available information consisting of the history of trades Ht, t = 1, . . . , T , and the risky
asset’s prior distribution P (V ), informed traders form their expectations based on a
private signal S ∈ {S1, S2, S3} regarding the true value of the asset. They buy (sell)
one unit of the asset if their expected value of the asset E[V | S,Ht] is strictly greater
(smaller) than the ask (bid) price quoted by the market maker. Otherwise, informed
traders choose not to trade. In the empirical herding literature, institutional investors
are viewed as a typical example for informed traders. In contrast to informed traders,
noise traders trade randomly, that is, they decide to buy, sell, or not to trade with
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equal probability of 1/3. pt denotes the price at which the asset is traded in period t.
The Private Signal: The distribution of the private signals S1, S2, S3 is conditional
on the true value of the asset. Denote the conditional signal matrix by P (S = Si | V =
Vj) = (p




For each row i,
∑3
j=1 p
ij is the likelihood that an informed trader receives the signal
Si. An informed trader’s behavior is critically dependent on the shape of her private
signal. Specifically, Park and Sabourian (2011) define a signal Si to be
• monotonically decreasing iff pi1 > pi2 > pi3,
• monotonically increasing iff pi1 < pi2 < pi3,
• U-shaped iff pi1 > pi2 and pi2 < pi3.
Traders with monotone signals are confident about the asset’s true value and rarely
change their trading decision. That is, an optimistic trader with an increasing signal
will only buy or hold, whereas a pessimistic trader with a decreasing signal will only sell
or hold. In contrast, traders with U-shaped signals face a high degree of uncertainty
and may decide to buy, sell or hold. U-shaped traders are more easily swayed to change
their initial trading decision as they observe trade histories Ht with a strong accumu-
lation of traders on one side of the market. In fact, Park and Sabourian (2011) show
that a U-shaped signal is a necessary condition for herding. Park and Sabourian (2011)
also introduce hill-shaped signals which are necessary for contrarian behavior. Since
contrarian behavior is self-defeating, its destabilizing effects are limited and thus of
only secondary importance for financial markets. Consequently, we exclude hill-shaped
signals from our analysis. In the following, we assume that S1 is monotone decreasing,
S2 is U-shaped and S3 is monotone increasing. The conditional private signal distribu-
tion P (S | V ) determines the degree of information asymmetry between market maker
and informed traders. The less noisy the signal, the higher the informational advantage
of the informed traders.
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The Market Maker: Trading takes place in interaction with a market maker who
quotes a bid and an ask price. The market maker only has access to public information
and is subject to perfect competition such that he makes zero-expected profit. Accord-
ingly, he sets the ask (bid) price equal to his expected value of the asset given a buy
(sell) order and the public information. Formally, he sets askt = E[V |Ht ∪ {at = buy}]
and bidt = E[V |Ht ∪{at = sell}], where at is the action of a trader in period t ≥ 2 and
Ht := {(a1, p1), ..., (at−1, pt−1)}.
2.2 Herding Intensity
Park and Sabourian (2011) describe herding as a “history-induced switch of opinion [of
a certain informed trader] in the direction of the crowd.” Thus, only informed traders
can herd. More precisely, a herding trade is defined as follows:
Definition 1: Herding
Let bt (st) be the number of buys (sells) observed until period t. An informed trader
with signal S buy herds in t at history Ht if the following three conditions hold:
(BH1) E[V |S] < E[V ], i.e. an informed trader with signal S does not buy initially and
is more pessimistic regarding the asset’s true value than is the market maker.
(BH2) E[V |S,Ht] > askt, an informed trader with signal S buys in t.
(BH3) bt > st, i.e. the history of trades contains more buys than sells: the crowd buys.
Analogously, an informed trader with signal S sell herds in period t at history Ht if
and only if (SH1) E[V |S] > E[V ], (SH2) E[V |S,Ht] < bidt, and (SH3) bt < st hold
simultaneously.
Note that (BH1) and (SH1) imply that either buy or sell herding is possible for a
given model parameterization. Our definition of herding is less restrictive than the one
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used in Park and Sabourian (2011), who, for example, define buy herding as an extreme
switch from selling initially to buying. In our definition, buy herding also includes
switches from holding to buying, provided that the trader leans toward selling initially,
compare (BH1) and (BH2).7 As a consequence, herd traders always act informationally
inefficiently as their trading decisions contradict their private information. From an
empirical perspective, including switches from holding to selling or buying is important
as these actions may drive amplified stock price movements.
(BH3) and (SH3) also differ slightly from Park and Sabourian (2011) in which, for
example, buy herding requires E[V |Ht] > E[V ]. This condition is based on the idea
that prices rise when there are more buys than sells. However, this only holds if the
prior distribution of the risky asset P (V ) is symmetric around the middle state V2,
i.e. P (V1) = P (V3).
8 In fact, for asymmetric P (V ), it is possible that even though
a history Ht contains more buys than sells, the price of the asset goes down (i.e.,
E[V |Ht] < E[V ]). From an empirical perspective, asymmetric prior distributions P (V )
should not be ruled out a priori. Therefore, we modify the herding definition to ensure
that a herder always follows the crowd.
The above definition enables us to decide whether or not a particular trade by a
single investor at a specific point in time is a herd trade. In contrast, empirical herding
measures are based on a number of trades by different investors observed over a certain
time interval, see, e.g., Lakonishok et al. (1992) and Sias (2004). Since we aim to derive
theory-based predictions on herd behavior that can be tested empirically, we need to
aggregate herding in the model over time as well as over investors. We aggregate over
time by considering all relevant trades from t = 1, . . . , T . We aggregate over investors
by calculating herding intensity for the whole group of informed traders. Therefore,
we define herding intensity (HI) as the share of herding trades in the total number of
7According to Park and Sabourian (2011), such an extension of the herding definition is theoretically
legitimate. They focus on the stricter version to be consistent with earlier theoretical work on herding.
8Note that Park and Sabourian (2011) assume symmetry of the risky asset’s prior distribution
throughout their paper (see Park and Sabourian (2011), p.980).
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informed trades.
Definition 2: Herding Intensity
Let binT and s
in
T be the number of buys and sells of informed traders observed until
period T , i.e. during the entire time interval under consideration. Let bhT and s
h
T
denote the corresponding number of buy and sell herding trades. Then,










Standard empirical herding measures including those of Lakonishok et al. (1992) and
Sias (2004) are calculated using only buys and sells, see Section 4. To be consistent
with empirical herding measures, we exclude holds when calculating the number of
informed trades in the definition of theoretical herding intensity.
2.3 Information Risk and Market Stress in the Herd Model
2.3.1 Information Risk
In Easley et al. (1996), information risk is the probability that a trade is executed
by an informed trader. Hence, information risk coincides with the parameter µ, the
fraction of informed traders, in the Park and Sabourian (2011) model. From a theo-
retical perspective, the effect of changes in µ on herding intensity is ambiguous. On
the one hand, herding may increase with information risk because a higher µ implies
that there are more potential herders (U-shaped traders) in the market. Indeed, due
to the self-enforcing nature of herd behavior a higher µ contributes to longer-lasting
herds and, hence, stronger herding intensity. Moreover, a higher fraction of informed
traders implies that the average information content of a single trade increases. As
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a consequence, informed traders update their beliefs more quickly and those traders
that are susceptible to herd behavior are more easily swayed to change from buying to
selling and vice versa. On the other hand, a rise in µ may also reduce herding intensity.
Since the average information content per trade increases in µ, herds tend to break up
more quickly as traders stop herding after observing fewer trades on the opposite side
of the market. Higher information risk further amplifies the market maker’s adverse
selection problem, compare Easley et al. (2002). Given the higher probability of trading
at an informational disadvantage, the market maker quotes larger bid-ask spreads in
order to avoid losses. The larger spread, in turn, requires potential herders to observe
much stronger accumulation of traders on one side of the market before they alter their
trading decision.
2.3.2 Market Stress
Times of high market stress and crisis periods are typically understood as situations
where investors are confronted with a deteriorating economic outlook and increased
uncertainty about stock values, compare e.g. Schwert (2011). A negative economic
outlook in the Park and Sabourian (2011) model is captured by low expectations re-
garding the asset’s true value E[V ]. A low E[V ] not only describes a deteriorated
outlook by the public but also a high degree of pessimism among informed traders.
First, lower public expectations E[V ] result in lower private expectations E[V |S] for
all informed traders. Second, there tend to be more decreasing signals (pessimists)
among informed traders as well as fewer increasing signals (optimists) for low E[V ]
than for high E[V ]. Uncertainty in the Park and Sabourian (2011) can be sorted into
two types: public uncertainty and informed trader uncertainty. Public uncertainty is
given by the variance of the risky asset Var(V ). Informed trader uncertainty (IU) is
measured by the probabilities that informed traders receive a U-shaped signal condi-
tional on Vj , j = 1, 2, 3: IU :=
∑3
j=1 p
2j . The higher IU, the more traders there are
in the market with U-shaped signals and, hence, the higher the uncertainty among
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informed traders.9 In light of the recent financial crisis, we are particularly interested
in comparing herding intensity in times of high market stress with the herding intensity
predicted for more optimistic periods.
The overall effect of market stress on herding intensity is not obvious and crucially
depends on model parameterization. In particular, buy and sell herding intensity may
react differently to changes in market stress. Consider, for example, an increase in
market stress due to a decrease in E[V ]. More specifically, assume a shift of probability
mass from V3 to lower values. First, if, for a given model parameterization, buy herding
is possible (and hence sell herding is impossible), a marginal reduction in P (V3) would
result in a decrease in buy herding intensity, whereas sell herding intensity would remain
constant at 0. Similarly, if sell herding is possible for a given model parameterization
(and buy herding impossible), a marginal reduction in P (V3) would result in an increase
in sell herding intensity while buy herding intensity would remain unaffected. This
converse effect on buy and sell herding intensity is due to the fact that a reduction
in P (V3) diminishes the probability of buy-dominated trade histories and increases
the probability of sell-dominated histories. Hence, potential sell (buy) herders are
more (less) likely to be confronted with a trade history that sways them into herding.
Second, if the U-shaped signal is positively biased, i.e., P (S2 | V1) < P (S2 | V3),
a reduction of P (V3) diminishes the number of U-shaped traders in the market and,
hence, tends to decrease buy as well as sell herding intensity. Finally, for a whole range
of model parameterizations, a lower E[V ] may even contribute to an increase in buy
herding intensity and a decrease in sell herding intensity. Since a lower E[V ] implies
that more informed traders are initially inclined to sell, the number of potential sell
herders declines. Correspondingly, buy herding becomes more likely.
9Note that an increase in Var(V ) may reduce the number of U-shaped traders in the market.
This effect is not necessarily offset by an increase in IU. One could circumvent this issue by ad-




2jP (V = Vj) must also be high in times of market stress. Since this does not af-
fect the results of our simulation, we choose not to complicate the model by adding this characteristic
to the uncertainty definition.
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These complex and partly counteracting effects, in conjunction with the history-
dependent updating of beliefs, lead to a low analytical tractability of herding intensity
in the Park and Sabourian (2011) model, see the Appendix. This particularly applies to
the empirically relevant case where herding intensity is considered as an average over a
set of stocks with heterogeneous characteristics. In the following, therefore, empirically
testable predictions about the effects of information risk and market stress on average
herding intensity are derived by numerically simulating the model over a broad set of
model parameterizations.
3 Simulation of the Herd Model for a Heterogeneous Stock
Index
3.1 Average Herding Intensity
Empirical studies on herd behavior typically derive results for herding intensity as an
average for a large set of stocks and over certain time intervals. The stocks under
consideration are likely to differ in their characteristics implying that each stock is
described by a distinct parameterization for the fraction of informed traders, the prior
distribution of the asset, and the distribution of the private signals. In accordance with
the empirical literature, we are particularly interested in herding intensity defined as an
average over a broad range of model parameterizations that reflects the heterogeneity
in stock market indices. Specifically, we define average herding intensity as follows:
Definition 3: Average Herding Intensity
For a given set of model parameterizations I and length T of the trading period,







where BHIi stands for the buy herding intensity obtained for model parameterization




T,i correspond to the number of informed trades
observed for that parameterization.
The definition for average sell herding intensity SHI follows analogously.
Weights wi ensure that average herding intensity is not biased upward by simulation
outcomes with a low number of informed trades.10
3.2 The Simulation Setup
We choose µ, the fraction of informed traders, from
M = {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9}.
Accordingly, we simulate the model for |M| = 9 different levels of information risk.
In the German stock market, the share of institutional (i.e. informed) trading for the
sample period ranges from 0.2 to 0.7, compare Kremer and Nautz (2013a).
The prior distribution of the risky asset P (V ) is chosen from
P = {P (V ) ∈ {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9}3 :
3∑
i=1
P (Vi) = 1}.
Since we impose that V takes each value V1 = 0, V2 = 1, V3 = 2 with positive probability,
P (Vi) cannot be 0.9, which gives us |P| = 36 different prior distributions.
The conditional signal distribution P (S|V ) = (pij)i,j=1,2,3 has to be chosen from
the space of leftstochastic 3-by-3 matrices. As before, we discretize this space by
10Consider, for example, a situation where we observe a herding intensity of 0.5 as 2 out of 4 informed
trades are herd trades. Now assume that for another simulation the herding intensity is 0 as 0 out of 16
informed trades are herd trades. In this case, the unweighted average of simulated herding intensities
would be 0.25, which overestimates herding intensity as only 2 out of 20 trades were herd trades across
the whole sample.
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imposing a grid ranging from 0.1 to 0.9. All elements of P (S|V ) are positive, that is,
all signals are noisy in the sense that an informed trader cannot with certainty rule
out any of the three possible states for V . Following Park and Sabourian (2011), there
are always optimists (p31 < p32 < p33), pessimists (p11 > p12 > p13), and U-shaped
(p21 > p22, p22 < p23) traders in the market, see Section 2.1. Finally, informed traders
tend to be well-informed, that is, if the bad state V = V1 realizes, most of the informed
traders will be pessimistic and few are optimistic (p11 > p21 > p31) and vice versa for
V = V3 (p
13 < p23 < p33). This implies that the set of simulated signal structures (C)
can be summarized as follows:
C = {P (S|V ) = (pij)i,j=1,2,3 leftstochastic : pij ∈ {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9},
p11 > p21 > p31, p13 < p23 < p33,
p11 > p12 > p13, p31 < p32 < p33, p21 > p22, p22 < p23, },
which leads to |C| = 41 different signal structures used in the simulation.
Considering all combinations, one obtains the simulation set Ω := M × P × C,
where |Ω| = 9 · 36 · 41 = 13284. Each element ω = (µ, P (V ), P (S|V )) ∈ Ω describes the
characteristics of a specific stock.11 Park and Sabourian (2011) derive upper bounds
for µ that have to hold in order for herding to be possible. One can check that these
upper bounds are never binding for ω ∈ Ω, i.e. in each of the following simulations,
either sell or buy herding is possible (see Park and Sabourian (2011), pp. 991-992,
1011-1012). Each stock is traded over T = 100 points of time. For each stock, the
simulation is repeated 2, 000 times which produces more than 2.6 billion simulated
trades for analysis.12
11In practice, stock characteristics ω may not be constant over time. For example, the Deutsche
Bank share before the financial crisis is likely to have different characteristics than the Deutsche Bank
share during the crisis.
12Matlab codes are available on request.
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Figure 1: Information risk and herding intensity
(a) Sell Herding (b) Buy Herding
Notes: SHI and BHI are plotted against information risk. On the ordinate we plot average herding
intensity. Information risk µ is plotted along the horizontal. Average herding intensity is calculated as
the weighted cross-sectional average for the simulated SHI and BHI of stocks contained in {µ}×P×C.
The weights correspond to the observed number of informed trades. The boxplots show the variation
across 2,000 simulations of average herding intensity for a fixed level of information risk µ.
3.3 Simulation Results: Information Risk and Average Herding In-
tensity
To discover the impact of information risk on average herding intensity, we fix µ ∈ M
and calculate average herding intensity as the cross-sectional average over all parame-
terizations in {µ} × P × C, where |{µ} × P × C| = 1 · 36 · 41 = 1, 476.
Figure 1 shows the comparative statics for average sell and buy herding intensity
with respect to changes in information risk µ. The simulation results clearly indi-
cate that SHI and BHI symmetrically increase with information risk. The boxplots
demonstrate that the simulation results are very stable. Indeed, the variation of av-
erage herding intensity for a given level of information risk is relatively low, whereas
its increase is rather steep as µ goes up. This particularly applies to the empirically
relevant range of µ ∈ [0.2, 0.7]. Only as µ approaches 1, do SHI and BHI level out
and exhibit higher variations.
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The model simulation shows that the increasing effects of a rise in information risk
on herding intensity dominate the decreasing effects. Only as the share of informed
traders surpasses 80%, does the adverse selection problem of the market maker begin to
impair market liquidity severely enough that trading among the potential herders breaks
down. The ambiguity of their signal prevents them from paying the high premiums
now demanded by the market maker via large bid-ask spreads. We summarize the
simulation-based insight from Figure 1 as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Information Risk and Herding Intensity Average sell and buy
herding intensity increase in information risk.
3.4 Simulation Results: Market Stress and Average Herding Intensity
For the analysis of the effects of market stress we define two distinct classes of stocks
and compare the average herding intensity of each. The first class comprises all stocks
that have high market stress characteristics; the second class all stocks that show low
market stress characteristics. In line with the definition of market stress developed in
Section 2.3.2, a simulated stock ω ∈ Ω is subject to high market stress if it exhibits
both above-average uncertainty and below average E[V ]. Correspondingly, low market
stress stocks are defined by below-average uncertainty and above-average E[V ]. The
averages are the respective medians of the simulated model parameterizations.13 We
compare the cross-sectional average SHI and BHI over all high market stress stocks
with the SHI and BHI obtained for all low market stress stocks.
The simulation results for the impact of market stress on average sell and buy
herding intensity are shown in Table 1. As expected, both sell and buy herding are
13Specifically, we obtain the median degree of pessimism (public uncertainty) by calculating E[V ]
(Var(V )) for each of the 36 simulated prior distributions P (V ) ∈ P and then determine their me-
dian. Correspondingly, we calculate the median informed uncertainty over the set of simulated signal
structures C.
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Table 1: The effects of market stress on average herding intensity
SHI BHI








Notes: This table reports the simulated average sell (SHI) and buy herding intensity (BHI) for stocks
under high market stress and stocks under low market stress. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Welch’s t-test reveals that SHI as well as BHI increase significantly during times of high market stress
for usual significance levels. Out of the 13,284 simulated stocks, 1,368 classify as high market stress and
1,008 as low market stress. Average herding intensities are calculated as the weighted cross-sectional
averages of the simulated SHI and BHI for stocks in each respective class. The figures in the table
are the weighted average and the weighted standard deviation of 2,000 iid simulated outcomes of SHI
and BHI under high and low market stress, respectively. For all calculations, the weights correspond
to the observed number of informed trades.
more pronounced during times of high market stress. Interestingly, however, the rise
in buy herding intensity is greater than that of sell herding intensity. This puzzling
asymmetry can be explained by disentangling the effects of an increase in uncertainty
and pessimism.
Table 2 shows that SHI and BHI symmetrically increase with uncertainty. High
public uncertainty is associated with lower prior probabilities for the middle state of the
risky asset. Since informed traders receiving U-shaped signals discount the probability
for the middle state anyway, high public uncertainty amplifies their tendency to form
strong beliefs that only the extreme states of the risky asset can be true. As they
rule out one of the extreme states based on the observed trading history, they quickly
alter their trading decisions toward that of the crowd. This effect is intensified if private
uncertainty is also high since such leads to a larger share of U-shaped traders. Since this
argument applies equally to sell and buy herding, the increasing effect of uncertainty
on herding intensity is symmetric.
In contrast, Table 3 reveals, that a reduction in E[V ] affects SHI and BHI in
opposite ways. While increased pessimism contributes to buy herding, it significantly
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Notes: This table reports the simulated SHI and BHI for stocks with high and low uncertainty
respectively. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Welch’s t-test reveals that SHI as well as
BHI increase significantly during times of high uncertainty for usual significance levels. Out of the
13,284 simulated stocks, 3,078 exhibit high and, 2,268 low, uncertainty. Average herding intensities are
calculated as the weighted cross-sectional averages of the simulated SHI and BHI for stocks in each
respective class. The figures in the table are the weighted average and the weighted standard deviation
of 2,000 iid simulated outcomes of SHI and BHI under high and low uncertainty, respectively. For all
calculations, the weights correspond to the observed number of informed trades.
reduces sell herding. This result is driven by the fact that during times of grim eco-
nomic outlook, most informed traders sell anyway. Herd behavior, however, requires
a trader to alter her initial trading decision. For sell herding to be possible, for in-
stance, the trader has to be initially inclined to buy the asset. Only informed traders
receiving U-shaped signals with strong biases toward the high state of the risky asset
(i.e., p21 << p23) may still be inclined to buy initially for low E[V ]. As E[V ] drops, so
does the number of simulated signal structures in C that exhibit a sufficiently strong
positive bias of the U-shaped trader for sell herding to be possible. By the same line
of reasoning, BHI increases with low E[V ]. We emphasize that the results in Table
3 do not contradict strong accumulations of traders on the sell side during times of
deteriorated economic outlook. The Park and Sabourian (2011) model predicts that
such a consensus in trade behavior is not driven by a switch in traders’ opinion toward
that of the crowd but is due to a high share of equally pessimistic traders all acting on
similar information. Such correlation of trade behavior is called spurious or uninten-
tional herding in the literature, compare e.g. Kremer and Nautz (2013a) and Hirshleifer
and Hong Teoh (2003).
The simulation shows that the positive effect of increased uncertainty on sell herding
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Table 3: The effects of economic outlook on average herding intensity
SHI BHI








Notes: This table reports the simulated SHI and BHI for stocks where traders show high and low
degrees of pessimism respectively. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Welch’s t-test reveals a
highly asymmetric effect for sell and buy herding. Indeed, SHI decreases as pessimism increases
while BHI increases with the degree of pessimism. The results are significant at all usual significance
levels. Out of the 13,284 simulated stocks, 5,904 stocks exhibit high and low degrees of pessimism.
Average herding intensities are calculated as the weighted cross-sectional averages of the simulated
SHI and BHI for stocks in each respective class. The figures in the table are the weighted average
and the weighted standard deviation of 2,000 iid simulated outcomes of SHI and BHI under high and
low uncertainty, respectively. For all calculations, the weights correspond to the observed number of
informed trades.
dominates the negative effect of increased pessimism. This leads to an overall slight
increase in SHI during times of high market stress. In contrast, the complementary
effect of uncertainty and pessimism on buy herding results in a surge of BHI during
times of high market stress. We consolidate these simulation results in the following
Hypothesis 2: Herding Intensity and Market Stress In times of high market
stress, the increase in buy herding is more pronounced than that of sell herding.
4 Empirical Herding Measure
Simulating a herd model allows us to determine for each trade whether herding actually
occurred. As a result, the exact herding intensity can be calculated for each model
simulation. In an empirical application, it is much more difficult to decide whether or
not a trader herds since researchers have no access to private signals.
The dynamic herding measure proposed by Sias (2004) is designed to explore
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whether (institutional) investors follow each others’ trades by examining the corre-
lation between the traders’ buying tendency over time. The Sias herding measure,
therefore, is particularly appropriate for high-frequency data. Similar to the static
herding measure proposed by Lakonishok et al. (1992), the starting point of the Sias
measure is the number of buyers as a fraction of all traders. Specifically, consider a
number of Nit institutions trading in stock i at time t. Out of these Nit institutions,
a number of bit institutions are net buyers of stock i at time t. The buyer ratio brit is
then defined as brit =
bit
Nit
. According to Sias (2004), the ratio is standardized to have





where σ(brit) is the cross-sectional standard deviation of buyer ratios across I stocks at
time t. The Sias herding measure is based on the correlation between the standardized
buyer ratios in consecutive periods:
∆it = βt∆i,t−1 + εit. (2)
The cross-sectional regression is estimated for each time t. In the second step, the Sias





The Sias methodology further differentiates between investors who follow the trades
of others (i.e., true herding according to Sias (2004)) and those who follow their own
trades. For this purpose, the correlation is decomposed into two components:


























where I is the number of stocks traded. Dnit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if
institution n is a buyer in i at time t and 0 otherwise. Dmi,t−1 is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if trader m (who is different from trader n) is a buyer at time t−1. Therefore, the
first part of the measure represents the component of the cross-sectional inter-temporal
correlation that results from institutions following their own strategies when buying
or selling the same stocks over adjacent time intervals. The second part indicates the
portion of correlation resulting from institutions following the trades of others over
adjacent time intervals. A positive correlation that results from institutions following
other institutions, that is, the latter part of the decomposed correlation, can be regarded
as evidence of herd behavior. In the subsequent empirical analysis, we therefore focus on
the latter term of Equation (3), which we denote by Sias. According to Choi and Sias
(2009), Equation (3) can be further decomposed to distinguish between the correlations
associated with “buy herding” (bri,t−1 > 0.5) and “sell herding” (bri,t−1 < 0.5).
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Data
The data are from the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin). Un-
der Section 9 of the German Securities Trading Act, all credit institutions and financial
services institutions are required to report to BaFin any transaction in securities or
derivatives that trade on an organized market. These records make it possible to iden-
tify all relevant trade characteristics, including the trader (the institution), the partic-
ular stock, time, number of traded shares, price, and the volume of the transaction.
Moreover, the records specify on whose behalf the trade was executed, that is, whether
the institution traded for its own account or on behalf of a client that is not a financial
institution. Only institutions that fall under Section 9 of the German Securities Trading
Act are allowed to submit trade orders to German trading platforms. Therefore, the
data are a comprehensive repository of all trades executed on German stock exchanges
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during the sample period. Since this study is concerned with institutional trades, par-
ticularly those of financial institutions, we restrict our attention to the trading of own
accounts, that is, those cases where a bank or financial services institution is clearly the
originator of the trade. We exclude institutions trading exclusively for the purpose of
market making. We also exclude institutions that are formally mandated as designated
sponsors, i.e., liquidity providers, for a specific stock. For each stock, there are usually
about two institutions formally mandated as market maker. The institutions are not
completely dropped from the sample (unless they have already been excluded due to
engaging in purely market maker business), but only for those stocks for which they
act as designated sponsors.14 We are particularly interested in the herding behavior
of institutional investors because they are more likely to be informed compared to, for
example, retail investors. Moreover, institutional investors are the predominant class
in the stock market, with the power to move the market and impact prices, particularly
if they herd.
The analysis focuses on shares listed on the DAX 30 (the index of the 30 largest and
most liquid stocks), where stocks are selected according to the index compositions at the
end of the observation period on March 31, 2009. Following the empirical literature, we
require that at least five institutions were active in the market at each trading interval.
Using data from July 2006 to March 2009 (698 trading days), we are able to investigate
whether trading behavior has changed during the financial crisis. Over the sample
period, there are 1,120 institutions engaging in proprietary transactions. Among those
1,120 traders, 1,044 trade on the DAX 30 stocks.
14The designated sponsors for each stock are published at http://www.deutsche-boerse.com. For
more information about the data, see Kremer and Nautz (2013a,b).
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5.2 Information Risk and Herding Intensity in the German Stock
Market
The higher the number of informed traders active in a market, the higher the probability
of informed trading and, thus, information risk. According to Hypothesis 1, average
herding intensity increases with information risk, reflected in the parameter µ, the
fraction of informed traders. In the following, we use two empirical proxies for the level
of information risk: (i) the number of active institutional traders and (ii) the share of
the institutional trading volume.
According to Foster and Viswanathan (1993) and Tannous et al. (2013), the fraction
of informed traders and, thus, information risk cannot be expected to be constant
over a trading day. To account for intra-day trading patterns in the German stock
market, we divide each trading day into 17 half-hour intervals. A trading day is defined
as the opening hours of the trading platform Xetra (9 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.), on which
the bulk of trades occur. The use of half-hour intervals ensures that the number of
active institutions is sufficiently high for calculating intra-day herding measures.15 The
first two columns of Table 4 show how both empirical proxies for information risk are
distributed within a day. For both measures of trading activity, institutional traders
are more active during the opening and closing intervals.
To investigate the intra-day pattern of herding intensity, we calculate the Sias herd-
ing measure for each half-hour interval separately. The results of this exercise are also
shown in Table 4. The third column shows for each interval the overall Sias measure
(Sias), which is based on the average correlation of buy ratios between two intervals (see
Equation (2)). Following Sias (2004), this correlation may overstate the true herding
intensity because it does not account for correlation resulting from traders who follow
themselves. It is a distinguishing feature of our investor-specific data that they allow
addressing that problem even on an intra-day basis. In particular, Column 4 reports
15For sake of robustness, we also divide the trading day into nine one-hour intervals, but our main
results do not depend on this choice. For brevity, results are not shown but are available on request.
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Table 4: Information risk and herding intensity within a trading day
Information risk Herding intensity
Time Traders Trading V olume Sias Sias
09:00 - 09:30 25.33 6.73 − −
































































Notes: The table shows how information risk and herding intensity evolves over the trading day.
Traders denotes the average number of active institutional traders; Trading V olume refers to the
average percentage share of the daily trading volume of institutional investors. For instance, on average,
6.73% of the daily institutional trading volume occured between 9 a.m. and 9:30 a.m. The columns
do not add to 1 because we focus on the predominant German platform Xetra R©, where trading takes
place from 9 a.m. till 5.30 p.m. CET, while the opening period for the German stock exchange at the
floor ends at 8 p.m. Sias and Sias represent the overall and the adjusted Sias herding measure (in
percent), where the latter only considers institutions that follow the trades of others, see Equation (3).
Standard errors are in parentheses.
the correlation due to investors following the trades of others (Sias) (see Equation (3)).
Table 4 offers several insights into the intra-day pattern of institutional herding.
First, both Sias measures provide strong evidence for the presence of herding for each
half-hour interval of the trading day. Second, intra-day herding measures are signifi-
cantly larger than those obtained with low-frequency data, compare Kremer and Nautz
(2013a,b). Third, the sizable differences between Sias and Sias highlight the impor-
tance of using investor-specific data.
How is the observed intra-day variation of information risk related to the intra-
day herding intensity of institutional investors? In line with the intuition of Park and
Sabourian (2011), the Sias herding measure depends on the trading behavior in two
subsequent time periods. On the one hand, high information risk in t − 1 leads in-
stitutional investors to believe that there is a high degree of information contained
in previously observed trades. On the other hand, high information risk in t ensures
that there is a high number of potential herders active in the market. Both effects
contribute positively to herding intensity in period t. Therefore, for each time interval
herding intensity is compared with the average information risk of the corresponding
time intervals. Figure 2 reveals a strong intra-day co-movement between both proxies
of information risk and Sias. In fact, we find overwhelming evidence in favor of Hy-
pothesis 1: the rank-correlation coefficient between the average trading volume and the
corresponding Sias measure is 0.80, which is both economically and statistically highly
significant. Very similar results are obtained for the number of active institutional
traders, where the correlation coefficient equals 0.67.16
Note that the peaks in Sias at market opening and following the opening of the
U.S. market at 3:30 p.m. – 4 p.m. correspond with high activity by informed traders,
suggesting that at market openings there is a lot of information contained in observed
16These results can be confirmed using standard correlation coefficients, which are also large and
significant at all conventional levels for both empirical proxies of information risk. Note that a rank-
correlation coefficient might be more appropriate than the standard correlation coefficient, since it
accounts for the potentially non-linear relation between information risk and herding intensity suggested
by the numerical simulation of the herd model (see Figure 1).
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Figure 2: Information Risk and Average Herding Intensity within a Trading Day
trades on which subsequent traders herd. This confirms the experimental findings of
Park and Sgroi (2012), who observe that traders with relatively strong signals trade
first, while potential herders delay.
5.3 Herding Intensity in the German Stock Market Before and During
the Financial Crisis
According to Hypothesis 2, both sell and buy herding should increase in times of high
market stress when uncertainty increases and markets become more pessimistic about
the value of the asset. However, the increase in sell herding is predicted to be smaller
than the one in buy herding. In our application, a natural candidate to test this
hypothesis is the outbreak of the financial crisis. To investigate the effect of the crisis
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Table 5: Herding Intensity - Before and During the Financial Crisis


















Notes: This table reports adjusted (Sias) and unadjusted (Sias) herding measures based
on half-hour intervals estimated separately for the pre-crisis and the crisis period. The
Sias measures are further decomposed into buy and sell herding components (see Section
4). Standard errors are in parentheses.
on herding intensity, we calculate sell and buy herding measures for the crisis and the
pre-crisis period separately. The pre-crisis period ends on August 9, 2007 as this is
widely considered to be the starting date of the financial crisis in Europe, see, e.g.,
European Central Bank (2007) and Abbassi and Linzert (2012).
Herding measures obtained before and during the crisis are displayed in Table 5.
The results confirm the predictions of the simulated model. The statistically significant
yet small increase in sell herding (5.74 > 5.41) is well in line with Hypothesis 2 as is
the more pronounced surge in buy herding (5.09 > 4.10).
Apparently, in times of deteriorated economic outlook when traders are exposed to
recurring bad news, a small but unexpected accumulation on the buy side is quickly in-
terpreted as good news about an asset’s value and induces investors to follow the crowd
(as small as it may be) into the alleged investment opportunity. Such behavior—in light
of Hypothesis 2—is by no means purely based on investor sentiment or irrationality,
but may be perfectly rational. In line with our theoretical results, the increase in sell
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herding during the crisis period indicates that the high uncertainty effect dominates
the low expectation effect discussed in Section 3. The increase, however, may also
be explained by reasons outside the model. If asset prices start to fall, selling may
become necessary in order for institutional traders to meet regulatory requirements.
The resulting accumulation of institutional traders on the sell side of the market may
upward bias the sell herding intensity detected by the empirical herding measure. Yet,
the small increase in sell herding intensity in the German stock market during the crisis
period indicates that these diluting effects of unintentional herding are not of particular
relevance for our sample.
6 Concluding Remarks
Due to data limitations and a lack of testable, model-based predictions, the theoretical
and the empirical herding literature are only loosely connected. This paper contributes
tightening this connection. First, we derive theory-based predictions regarding the
impact of information risk and market stress on herding intensity by numerically sim-
ulating the financial market herd model of Park and Sabourian (2011). We then test
these predictions empirically using a comprehensive data set from the German stock
market. As predicted by the model, we find that both buy and sell herding increase
symmetrically with information risk. Our empirical results further show that the herd
model can explain why buy and sell herding in the German stock market evolve asym-
metrically in response to increased market stress induced by the financial crisis.
There are several interesting avenues for future research that will aid in further
tightening the connection between the theoretical and empirical herding literature. For
example, during crises periods, correlation across assets and contagious effects may
play an important role in explaining investor behavior. Herd models, however, are
typically single-asset models and are not designed to provide insights regarding herd
intensity in a context of correlated assets and informational spillovers. Therefore, an
29
extension of herd models to a multiple asset setting would facilitate the interpretation of
evidence based on aggregate herding measures. A second suggestion involves the design
of empirical herding measures. The prevailing measures assess correlated trade behavior
(see, e.g., Lakonishok et al. (1992), Sias (2004), Patterson and Sharma (2010)) and thus
are able to detect the accumulation of investors on one side of the market. However,
these measures do not reveal whether this consensus in trade behavior is actually due
to true herding, that is, whether it is due to traders ignoring their private information
and instead copying the behavior of others. As a result, correlated trading indicated
by empirical herding measures is not necessarily a sign of inefficiency but could be a
joint reaction to the same information or due to the use of similar risk models, see
Kremer and Nautz (2013a). More work is needed to further our understanding to what
extent and under which circumstances empirical herding measures actually detect true
herding as understood by the theoretical literature.
30
References
Abbassi, P. and Linzert, T. (2012). The effectiveness of monetary policy in steering
money market rates during the financial crisis, Journal of Macroeconomics 34(4): 945
– 954.
Avery, C. and Zemsky, P. (1998). Multidimensional Uncertainty and Herd Behavior in
Financial Markets, The American Economic Review 88(4): 724–748.
Banerjee, A. V. (1992). A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 107(3): 797–817.
Barber, B. M., Odean, T. and Zhu, N. (2009). Do Retail Trades Move Markets?, Review
of Financial Studies 22(1): 151–186.
Bikhchandani, S., Hirshleifer, D. and Welch, I. (1992). A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Cus-
tom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, Journal of Political Economy
100(5): 992–1026.
Brunnermeier, M. K. (2001). Asset Pricing Under Asymmetric Information, Oxford
University Press.
Chari, V. and Kehoe, P. J. (2004). Financial crises as herds: overturning the critiques,
Journal of Economic Theory 119(1): 128 – 150.
Chiang, T. C. and Zheng, D. (2010). An empirical analysis of herd behavior in global
stock markets, Journal of Banking and Finance 34(8): 1911 – 1921.
Choi, N. and Sias, R. W. (2009). Institutional industry herding, Journal of Financial
Economics 94(3): 469 – 491.
Christie, W. G. and Huang, R. D. (1995). Following the pied piper: Do individual
returns herd around the market?, Financial Analysts Journal 51(4): 31 – 37.
31
Cipriani, M. and Guarino, A. (2005). Herd Behavior in a Laboratory Financial Market,
The American Economic Review 95(5): 1427–1443.
Cipriani, M. and Guarino, A. (2008). Herd Behavior and Contagion in Financial Mar-
kets, The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Contributions) 8(1): 1 – 54.
Cipriani, M. and Guarino, A. (2009). Herd behavior in financial markets: An exper-
iment with financial market professionals, Journal of the European Economic Asso-
ciation 7(1): 206–233.
Dasgupta, A., Prat, A. and Verardo, M. (2011). The price impact of institutional
herding, Review of Financial Studies 24(3): 892–925.
Devenow, A. and Welch, I. (1996). Rational herding in financial economics, European
Economic Review 40(3): 603–615.
Drehmann, M., Oechssler, J. and Roider, A. (2005). Herding and Contrarian Behavior
in Financial Markets: An Internet Experiment, The American Economic Review
95(5): 1403–1426.
Easley, D., Hvidkjaer, S. and O’Hara, M. (2002). Is information risk a determinant of
asset returns?, The Journal of Finance 57(5): pp. 2185–2221.
Easley, D., Kiefer, N. and O’Hara, M. (1996). Cream-skimming or profitsharing? The
curious role of purchased order flow, Journal of Finance 51(3): 811–833.
Easley, D., Kiefer, N. and O’Hara, M. (1997). One day in the life of a very common
stock, Review of Financial Studies 10(3): 805–835.
Easley, D. and O’Hara, M. (1987). Price, trade size, and information in securities
markets, Journal of Financial Economics 19(1): 69 – 90.
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A The History Dependence of Herding Intensity
Financial market herd models, including the model of Park and Sabourian (2011) , are
not designed to provide closed-form solutions for expected herding intensity. In this
appendix, we use two examples to demonstrate why numerical simulations are required
for obtaining model-based results regarding the impact of information risk and market
stress on herding intensity.
Even for a given model parameterization, model complexity prevents deriving a
closed-form analytical formula for herding intensity. The herding definition depends on
the market maker’s quotes, askt and bidt, as well as the informed traders’ expectations
regarding the asset’s true value E[V | S,Ht]. These quantities, in turn, depend on the
whole history of trades until t. In fact, not only the number of observed buys, sells and
holds but also their order affects expectations and quotes at time t. As a consequence,
even for a given model parameterization, each history path would need to be analyzed
separately to derive results on expected herding intensity.17
Let us illustrate this issue with a concrete numerical example. Assume the condi-
tional signal matrix P (S | V ) to be
P (S | V ) V1 = 0 V2 = 1 V3 = 2
S1 0.6 0.5 0.1
S2 0.3 0.1 0.4
S3 0.1 0.4 0.5
The distribution of the risky asset is P (V ) = [0.3 0.4 0.3]. Multiplying P (S |
V ) · P (V ) yields the unconditional probabilities P (S) = [0.41 0.25 0.34] that a trader
receives a signal S given that she is informed. Finally, the share of informed traders is set
17Given the sheer number of possible trading histories alone, an analytical derivation of SHI and BHI




Figure 3: Trading decisions of U-shaped trader for µ = 0.5
(a) H1001 = {25 buys, 50 sells, 25 buys}
(b) H1002 = {25 sells, 50 buys, 25 sells}
to be µ = 0.5. Only informed traders receiving the U-shaped signal S2 can herd. Given
that E[V ] = 1 < 1.12 = E[V | S2], the U-shaped trader can engage in sell herding only
if she is inclined to buy initially.18 We discuss two distinct trading histories consisting
of 100 trades and the exact same number of buys and sells. The only difference is the
order in which the trades are observed. Let H1001 = {25 buys, 50 sells, 25 buys} and
H1002 = {25 sells, 50 buys, 25 sells}. Figure 3 shows how a U-shaped trader would
decide to trade at every time t = 1, ..., 100 for the respective trading histories.
18Note that S2 holds initially as the ask price ask0 = 1.18 quoted by the market maker prevents S2
from buying.
37
Note that the number of trades for which S2 sell herds differs for the two histories.
Under H1001 , S2 potentially sell herds between periods 51 and 85, i.e. 35 times.
19 Under
H1002 , S2 potentially sell herds only 30 times. The share of U-shaped traders among
the population of all traders is µP (S2) = 0.5 · 0.25 = 0.125. Consequently, we expect
to observe a total number of shT,1 = 0.125 · 35 = 4.375 herding sells under H1100.
Correspondingly, under H1002 , we only have s
h
T,2 = 0.125 ·30 = 3.75 expected herd sells.
Furthermore, since µ = 0.5 and T = 100, we expect that both histories contain 50





T . Plugging in the expected values for numerator and denominator that we
just calculated, we obtain an expected sell herding intensity SHI1 = 4.375/50 = 0.0875
under H1001 and SHI2 = 3.75/50 = 0.75 under H
100
2 .
21 Finally note that the probability
of observing these histories P (H100i ) is also different for i = 1, 2, since the probability
of observing a certain trade (i.e., buy or sell) in t depends on the trading decisions of
the informed traders at t. This means, that in order to calculate an overall expected
herding intensity for the model parameterization above, we would need to analyze
SHI and P (H100) for all 3100 possible history paths separately, a task well beyond our
current computational capacity. Even if we were able to calculate that number, we
still would not have a formula that tells us how SHI would react to changes in certain
model parameters such as µ. Indeed, one can illustrate the many counteracting effects
of a change in µ that result in quite different outcomes for specific trading histories and
thus also prevent the derivation of analytical comparative static results.22
19Note that S2 does in fact start herding only in period 51, although she would already have decided
to sell in period 44. This is because the complete history does not contain more sells than buys until
period 51, which we demand in order to ensure that S2 actually follows the majority in the market.
20Note that for an arbitrary history, calculation of the expected number of informed trades is much
less straight forward since there is the possibility that informed traders hold and we hence have fewer
informed trades than 50. Since H1001 and H
100
2 do not contain any holds, however, this is not an issue
here.





Taylor approximation of order 1, however, yields that the expectation of a ratio can be consistently
estimated by the ratio of the expectations. As a consequence, all equations should be understood as
approximations. An exact calculation of expected herding intensity would be even more complicated.
22A numerical example how an increase in µ would affect SHI for the above trading histories is
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